By Stephen Engelberg, Special to the New York Times
The
Pentagon set up several highly secret units in the early 1980's that carried
out operations that in some cases were not disclosed to Congress or to appropriate
senior officials in the military and intelligence agencies, according to a
forthcoming book.
The
book, ''Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan
Era'' by Steven Emerson, quotes members of one unit as saying they were shown
a Central Intelligence Agency plan in 1983 that envisioned financing the Nicaraguan
rebels with profits from arms sales to foreign countries. Mr. Emerson writes
that as part of the operation, agents from the covert Army unit, code-named
Yellow Fruit, were to to set up covert airstrips in Costa Rica.
Yellow
Fruit was later disbanded after its members were court-martialed for financial
improprieties, Two years later, Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North, who was subsequently
dismissed as a National Security Council aide, used money from arms sales
to Iran to underwrite the contra resupply operation and construction of an
airstrip in Costa Rica. The C.I.A. has repeatedly denied knowing anything
of this effort and the Congressional Iran-contra committees investigated the
incident and were unable to find corroboration.
Other New Assertions
The book, excerpts of which are appearing this week's edition of U.S. News
and World Report, makes these other new assertions with regard to Colonel
North's operations and the Pentagon units:
* Colonel North's notebooks show that his efforts to free Americans kidnapped
in Lebanon included direct and indirect contacts with the Palestine Liberation
Organization, Libyans, and even Abu Nidal, the terrorist who Colonel North
testified had threatened his life. According to the book, Colonel North was
told that an intermediary representing the Americans had met with Walid Yousef,
a representative of Abu Nidal, on Aug. 5 and Aug. 6, 1986.
*
By November 1985, American intelligence had pinpointed the location of five
of the six hostages in Lebanon. They were said to be in the Sheik Abdullah
barracks in the Baalbek region of Lebanon, which is under Syrian control.
The American Ambassador to Syria, William Eagleton, told the Syrians they
would get full credit if the hostages were freed, but nothing happened
* One of the Army units put eavesdropping devices in the home of Gen. Manuel
Antonio Noriega, the Panamanian strongman. Some Army intelligence officials
feared that General Noriega was obtaining highly classified information from
United States military intelligence operations in Central America. A bug was
placed in General Noriega's conference room in an apartment complex used by
him in Panama City, the book said, but little information was obtained
* A classified C.I.A. document drafted in May 1984, said the agency ''has
reason to believe'' that a company headed by one of the key intermediaries
in the Iran dealings ''may be associated with Iranian terrorist-supported
activities being run out of official Iranian installations in Vienna and Barcelona.''
The head of the company, Albert Hakim, later was a key operative in the contra
resupply network and helped arrange diplomatic contacts with Iran. His lawyer,
Richard Janis, did not return a phone call requesting comment.
In
some cases, assertions in the book are supported by Government documents obtained
by Mr. Emerson. Other evidence was said to have been drawn from interviews
with military personnel involved in some of the activities described in the
book and from previously unreleased portions of Colonel North's notebook.
The
book describes how the military moved to improve its abilities for covert
operations and intelligence-gathering after the mission to rescue American
hostages in Iran failed in 1980. The units became involved in a wide range
of activities, sometimes in cooperation with the C.I.A. and at other times
in competition with it, the book says.
In
Central America, one of the units reportedly carried out an operation in which
Army aircraft owned by front companies were used to intercept communications
by Salvadoran guerrillas and the Nicaraguan military.
Operations 'Ripe' for Abuse
The
book also details how the creation of the special units was cloaked in secrecy
and kept from key military officers.
''The
genesis of Yellow Fruit was purposely poorly documented,'' Theodore Greenberg,
the Federal prosecutor who looked into Yellow Fruit, wrote in a classified
document obtained by Mr. Emerson.
''The inattention to command authority and responsibility in the Office of
Special Operations created an atmosphere which was ripe for the abuse of regulations
and unlawful activities which were carried on. If these abuses and unlawful
activities were not discovered at a relatively early stage, the damage would
have been inestimable.''
The
operations against General Noriega took place in 1982, the book says. At the
time, senior Army intelligence officials suspected that a female intelligence
agent assigned to cultivate General Noriega had developed ''too close a relationship
to the Panamaian leader,'' the book says. American officials reportedly also
feared that General Noriega was getting information from a Guatemalan Government
official who was having an affair with an American intelligence official stationed
in Panama.
An
Army investigation later concluded that the operation to bug General Noriega's
residence had not been approved by the intelligence officials who are required
to review such operations.